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1.  Introduction
School choice is a contentious issue in part because of the lack of agreement on many of
the important empirical issues surrounding the policy debate.
2 Evidence regarding the role of
such factors as peers and parents, class size and teacher quality, competition and bureaucracy,
unionization and curriculum design remains hotly debated, and the impact of increased choice on
many of these elements of school quality is still controversial. Yet we do have decades of
experience with school choice of a kind somewhat different from what is pondered in many
choice-based policy proposals, and it is within this current system of school choice that at least
some agreement can be found. While it may therefore be difficult to fully predict the impact of
new choice-based initiatives, information arising from the choices made by households in the
current system may yield important evidence regarding some neglected empirical issues that are
critical for policy makers to consider.  2
This paper begins by providing evidence regarding one such issue: the linkage between
housing and school consumption, and the impact that private schools (and private school
vouchers) can have by severing this linkage and thus setting off a series of general equilibrium
effects that are quite independent from many of the more controversial issues surrounding school
choice. The intuition behind these results is quite straightforward: In a residence-based public
school system, the location of a family’s residence directly determines which public school that
family’s children are eligible to attend. Housing markets are typically such that low income
families may not be able to afford housing in high quality public school districts, which implies
that choice among public schools is greater for some than for others. By bringing choice into low
income school districts, private school vouchers sever the link between school quality and
residential location thus increasing the value of living in poor public school districts and
lowering the value of living in wealthy districts. Such voucher proposals therefore tend to benefit
lower income households (through a variety of channels) more than high income households that
are already exercising choice in the present system. The research summarized in this paper
provides evidence on the potential magnitude of these benefits as well as the likely channels
through which they might emerge under a variety of different assumptions regarding empirical
factors that remain controversial. 
In addition, the paper proceeds to predict the impact of private schools choice on school
quality. While results regarding residential segregation are rather unambiguous and robust,
implications for school quality are more dependent on the precise underlying assumptions
regarding the impact of competition within schools.  Results indicate that, under the most
pessimistic assumptions, increasing school choice may lead to surprisingly small declines in3 To be fair, the models used to arrive at these analyses were not intended to arrive at predictions of the overall
impact of vouchers but rather to demonstrate some of the trade-offs involved (Manski (1992)) as well as explore such
issues as the efficiency of pricing policies of private schools (Epple and Romano (1998), Caucutt (forthcoming)).
Furthermore, it should be noted that previous approaches have investigated inequities within the public school system
(Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), for instance) but not in the presence of private school alternatives and/or vouchers.
4 Political economy models have been used extensively to analyze school finance issues (as in, for example,
Fernandez and Rogerson (1999)) as well as voting on vouchers (Bearse, Glomm and Ravikumar (2000), Glomm and
Ravikumar (1998)), but political economy models have not previously been combined with multi-district models of
public school finance as is done here.
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average public school quality and in the overall level of inequality in the system, while it may
yield substantial gains under more optimistic assumptions. The first of these results is surprising
because previous theoretical and simulation approaches have tended to compare the outcome
under private school vouchers to a rather idealized outcome where all public schools provide
equal educational quality, and these approaches have arrived at the conclusion that increased
private school choice must necessarily lower public school quality and raise inequities in an
otherwise equitable public school system.
3 Furthermore, these approaches have tended to not
model the political process through which public school spending is determined and have thus
ignored potential offsetting public school spending effects as some students leave the public
system.
4 The approach taken here, differs fundamentally in that it incorporates from the start the
very forces that have led to the inequities within the public system and in that it models
explicitly an underlying political process within this environment. The approach then exploits
the semi-competitive nature of the current public school system (and the resulting observed
inequities across school districts) in order to model the structural parameters underlying the
decisions made by households. This allows for a calibration of the model that can replicate
current features of the data and then come to conclusions about extending competition to private
schools in an environment where political and household choices are endogenously determined.4
It is then possible to compare these predictions to actual rather than idealized pre-voucher
outcomes. 
Section 2 provides a basic overview of the methodological approach taken throughout the
paper. While this approach is different from the reduced-form regression analysis typically
employed by empirical researchers, it is an approach particularly well suited for the kinds of
issues that are central to the school choice debate. Section 3 goes on to provide a non-technical
summary of the details of the theoretical assumptions employed in the model, and Section 4
provides the results from a number of policy simulations under different assumptions. The
remainder of the paper considers the empirical justification for the model’s key assumptions and
the evidence for some of its testable implications (Section 5) as well as some policy implications
arising from the simulation results (Section 6). Finally, Section 7 concludes. 
2.  Predicting the Impact of Increased Choice from the Current Choice System
While some have proposed marginal choice-based reforms to the current system, others
advocate making choice the central theme around which to reform primary and secondary
education. Conventional empirical approaches may be well suited to predicting some of the
likely effects of small changes to the system, but one becomes less confident in such predictions
as policy reforms get large and affect incentives, actions and prices throughout the system. Put
differently, large and discrete policy changes in an area as central to people’s lives as primary
and secondary education may change incentives in a way that brings to light forces which are
unlikely to be important with small policy changes and impossible to pick up with many of the
commonly employed empirical techniques. The approach taken in this paper therefore uses data5
on outcomes under the current limited choice system to infer preference and production
parameters in a very general model that incorporates forces likely to be important under large
scale reforms. Before presenting that model in Section 3,  Section 2.1 begins with a brief
discussion of how household choices under the current system lead to observable outcomes;
Section 2.2 then argues that these observable outcomes can be used as the basis of an approach
that can analyze the likely impact of large policy changes; and Section 2.3 arrives at some of the
basic features that must be modeled in order to implement this approach. 
2.1.  Choice under the Current System leads to Observable Outcomes
Choice has been a pervasive feature of school systems in most U.S. states for the past
half century. Parents can participate in the local political process that shapes their schools, and
they can choose among tens of thousands of school districts or neighborhood school areas in
which to reside. At least in principle, choice among many public schools is therefore pervasive.
Elite private schools as well as more common parochial schools offer additional options for
those unhappy with the public system. And choice is clearly being exercised. Approximately
twelve percent of U.S. school children attend private schools; a small but growing number are
home-schooled; and most significantly, many of those households that remain within the public
system consider public school quality carefully when choosing where to purchase or rent a
home. Real estate agents typically come armed with information regarding public school quality
associated with different neighborhoods, and such information is increasingly accessible through
less formal channels. It is therefore no surprise that measures of perceived school quality can
consistently explain at least a portion of the pattern of residential location that we observe, and5 See, for example, Nechyba and Strauss (1998) and Bayer (1999) for discrete choice approaches, as well as a
long literature on education and house prices with recent contributions such as Black (1999).
6 Even when lower quality housing is available in good school district, capitalization of public school quality
will tend to inflate the prices of such houses substantially.
6
house prices in good school districts are consistently higher than those in bad school districts.
5  
At the same time, differing constraints faced by different households clearly imply that
some have more choice than others. Career and job constraints, for instance, are likely to narrow
the number of possible public school districts that are feasible for different households.
Furthermore, either due to historical forces or because of deliberate zoning policies, lower
income parents may find little or no affordable housing in some of the otherwise feasible school
districts and neighborhoods.
6 Elite private schools are available only in some areas and are
similarly unaffordable for low income families, and even parochial schools are likely to be too
expensive for many. While some parents therefore clearly enjoy many school options, choice for
others may be quite constrained by job considerations, housing markets and lack of affordable
private school alternatives.
The combination of the exercise of these constrained political, residential and school
choices then results in various outcomes that we can measure and observe. House prices differ
both within and across school districts, and markets incorporate both house/neighborhood quality
and school quality considerations into these prices. Differing house quality and community
amenity levels result in some mixing of different income groups within districts as well as some
stratification by income across districts, both of which can generally be observed in the data.
Commonly reported spending levels in schools reflect the result of an aggregation of preferences
(however imperfect) through political institutions and thus give an indication of the value of per7 This approach is exemplified in Hoxby (1994, 2000b), McMillan (1999) and others.
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pupil spending in household preferences. Finally, private school attendance rates in different
districts give a measure of discontent within these districts with local public schools,  spending
levels and other features such as the quality of peer interactions within those schools.
2.2.  Using Observable Outcomes Today to Predict the Impact of Increased Choice Tomorrow
While the choices that households make under the current school system – and the
observed outcomes that result from these choices –  are interesting in and of themselves, they
also give rise to several research opportunities and challenges for those interested in predicting
the impact of expanding school choice. One possible strategy takes as its starting point the
empirical observation of varying degrees of choice withing the current school system (across,
say, metropolitan areas) and then attempts to link specific observed features of current public or
private schools to the degree of competition faced by those schools.
7 A second strategy begins
with a theoretical model that encompasses the forces we think are important for analyzing school
competition, then tries to calibrate that model so as to replicate the most important outcomes
(income and house price heterogeneity within and across districts, per pupil spending levels,
private school attendance rates) observed in the data under the current school system, and finally
introduces new policies into the calibrated model to see how such policies would change
outcomes. The first of these approaches therefore attempts to infer the impact of increased choice
directly from current data and is most appropriate for predicting changes resulting from marginal
policy adjustments. The second approach, on the other hand, uses the data to generate parameters
within a structural model and then asks that model to simulate the impact of new policies8
assuming that the underlying structural parameters (in preferences and production functions)
remain unchanged. Since economists generally are comfortable with the notion that preferences
and production functions themselves are exogenous, the latter approach allows a full unfolding
of all the forces within a general equilibrium setting where everything else is endogenous. This
approach is potentially most useful for predicting the impact of large and discrete changes in
policy, and it is the approach taken in this paper.
2.3.  Important Features to be Modeled under this Approach
In order to implement this approach successfully, however, one must begin by
convincingly identifying the core features of the current school choice environment (as well as
specifying functional forms for preferences and production processes whose parameters are then
to be dictated by the data.) It is therefore worthwhile to pause and ask precisely what features a
model would have to have in order to serve as an effective tool for the proposed analysis. 
Given the important role of residential location and mobility in the current choice
environment, one must start with a model that contains a heterogeneous housing market, with
some locations inherently more desirable (apart from school considerations) than others. When
applied to a specific context, such heterogeneity in housing within and across school districts is
important as it serves as one of the limiting factors in school district choice. Second, in order for
a relationship between housing and school choices to emerge under certain types of school
financing, the heterogeneous houses must somehow be classified into different political
jurisdictions. More precisely, it must be specified whether school finance decisions are made at
the central level or more locally by regional or district governments; and it must be made clear9
how children gain access to particular schools (i.e. whether this is by living in a given
jurisdiction or by some other rationing mechanism). Third, a meaningful analysis requires the
model to incorporate different types of households that face different constraints – where the
most important distinction between them is their wealth and ability. Fourth, in order for parents
to be able to choose a school within their constrained choice set, they must have a way of
evaluating school quality based on observable features within the model. Thus, an education
production process – or at least a parentally perceived production process –  must be formulated,
a task made particularly challenging by the continuing disagreement in the literature regarding
what matters in this process. Finally, both private and public schools can potentially enter the
constrained choice sets of each household, and these choice sets could be expanded by policies
such as private school vouchers. Therefore, we must model the private school market carefully,
allowing for supply responses in case of changing demand for private schools. 
3.  The Model
The first challenge, then, is to construct a tractable and internally consistent model with
(1) heterogeneous housing, (2) multiple jurisdictions describing how political choices regarding
funding of public schools and admissions requirements are made, (3) households with different
wealth and ability levels, (4) a specification of the education production process and (5) a
description of the  private school market. The second challenge is to use available data on
outcomes in the current choice environment to infer parameters of preferences and production
processes. A non-technical discussion of the elements of such a model (detailed more precisely
elsewhere) is offered in Section 3.1 followed by a discussion of how an equilibrium arises in8 The earliest theoretical development of the local public finance portion of this model is due to Dunz (1985).
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such a model (Section 3.2) and how the various parameters can me matched to important
features of the data (Section 3.3).
8 Once matched to the data, the model is then shown to be
relatively successful in replicating the outcomes we currently observe (Section 3.4).
3.1. Components of the Model 
The policy simulations in later sections are based on a model in which 1,500 types of
households that differ in their wealth level and child ability simultaneously choose where among
three school districts and 15 neighborhoods (or house types) to live, which school to attend and
how much public school spending to support at the ballot box. The overall number of houses
available in the three districts is assumed to be equal to the total number of households in the
model. Thus, there is exactly one house per household, but just as households differ in wealth
and ability, houses differ in quality. More precisely, the three school districts contain 5 house
types (or neighborhoods) each, and the total quantity of houses is the same in each of the three
districts. The quality of housing, however, differs among the three districts, with average quality
lowest in district 1 and highest in district 3. In addition, housing quality varies both within and
across districts, and some house types in district 1 are of higher quality than some house types in
district 3 despite the fact that average quality is highest in district 3. 
The house quality of a type h house in district d  is indexed by a parameter kdh, and this
parameter enters directly into the utility function that all households (regardless of wealth and9 An alternative way for a model to generate heterogeneity of housing and household types within districts is to
assume housing to be fully malleable and household preferences to differ in school quality (Epple and Platt (1998)). The
relative merits of that approach as compared to the one taken here (where houses are assumed to not be malleable and
preferences are assumed to be identical) are discussed in Section 5.
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ability) share.
9 In particular, households are assumed to value consumption c and school quality s
as well as house quality kdh. The utility of living in district d and house type h while consuming
school quality s and private consumption c is given by
(1) u(d,h,s,c) =kdh s
"c
$, 
and the 15 house quality parameters as well as " and $ are derived from the data in a way
described below. For now it should simply be noted that, since house prices are used to calibrate
the house quality parameters, anything that is captured in house prices is also captured in these
parameters. Specifically, in addition to standard housing quality measures, these parameters
would capture non-school related local amenities as well as non-school related neighborhood
externalities. 
School quality s depends on whether the household has chosen a private school or the
local public school. Two inputs are assumed to matter: (i) per pupil spending and (ii) average
peer quality in the school. Per pupil spending in the public school is determined through the
political process of local voting (on property taxes) combined with an exogenously specified
state aid formula (financed through state income taxes), while spending in the private schools is
set by the school in order to maximize profit. Similarly, the public school has no control over
peer quality but must admit all students who reside in the district and choose to attend the public
school, while private schools are able to set a lower bound on peer quality. (Peer quality itself is10 More specifically, peer quality for household n is given by q(n) = (z(n)
2 a(n)
(1-2))/7.5 – where z(n) is
household income and a(n) is child ability. The inclusion of both household income and child ability arises from different
notions of peer effects. Some view the school peer effect as primarily through parents and their involvement and
monitoring of schools (which we know increases in income (McMillan (1999)), while others see peer effects as operating
through child ability. The empirical literature offers little guidance as to the appropriate value for 2 which is set to 0.5 in
the simulations in this paper. Sensitivity analysis with respect to different values suggests that the precise value of 2 is not
critical for the results.
11 Note that, for purposes of predicting changes in behavior of households, it is unimportant whether per pupil
spending actually matters in generating better outcomes such as test scores – a proposition that continues to be
surrounded by controversy (Hanushek (1999), Krueger (1999), Hoxby (2000b)). Rather, what matters is whether
households value additional spending in schools – for whatever reason, and it is rather uncontroversial to say that they
might. Just how much households value spending as opposed to peer quality is determined by the parameter D as it is set in
a way to replicate the data. This is described in more detail below.
12 Different levels of inputs will of course nevertheless generally result in different levels of school quality among the
various schools – both public and private.
12
specific to each household type and is a combination of child ability and parental income.
10)
Either type of school then takes its per pupil spending x and combines it with average peer
quality q to produce s through the production process given by
(2) s = f(x,q) = Nx
(1-D) q
D where 0#D#1.
The parameter D is derived from the data in a way described below, and N is a function that
depends on how the impact of competition is modeled .
11 
More precisely, current researchers differ on whether public and private schools face
different types of production technologies. For many of the initial simulations reported in the
next section, we will therefore assume that N=1, and public and private schools face the same
production technology regardless of the nature of the competitive environment they face.
12 Under
such an assumption, the data requires that both per pupil spending and peer quality enter the
production process. If only spending mattered, the model would predict zero private school
attendance even for high levels of vouchers. On the other hand, if only peer effects mattered, no13 This is because the main competitive advantage a private school has in the model when production technologies are
identical to those of public schools is the ability to select its inputs – particularly the peer composition. When peer composition is
assumed not to matter, then there is simply not enough of a competitive advantage for private schools to convince anyone to pay
for them. On the other hand, if that competitive advantage is too large – i.e. if peers matter too much, then private school markets
can attract all students away from public schools. 
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public school could survive in the model even without any vouchers.
13 The assumption of
identical production processes for private and public schools therefore necessarily entails a
production process that places weight on both spending and peers – i.e. D falls strictly between 0
and 1 and is dictated rather precisely by the data. In later simulations, however, we will allow
technologies between schools to differ through the function N in ways that will me made more
precise in Section 4.22. These alternative models of school production essentially permit private
schools the additional advantage of more efficient resource use. However, here again the data
will restrict just how much private schools can differ from public schools while still permitting
the model to predict accurately the levels of private school attendance that are observed.
Specifically, as private schools gain a competitive advantage in terms of efficient resource use,
their other large competitive advantage (being able to select peers) must take on less importance
– i.e. D decreases as resource use is assumed to be more efficient in private schools. Since D
cannot fall below zero, the data therefore places a natural bound on how large the efficiency
advantage of private schools can be in the model. The “assumption” that either peer effects play
an important role or private schools are more efficient (or some combination of the two) is
therefore not an assumption at all. Rather, it is an empirical conclusion that arises from the need
to accurately predict current private school attendance rates. 
A second concern in modeling school production is that researchers currently know little
regarding the precise way in which peer effects enter school production or parentally perceived
school production. The most common assumption in the literature is that such peer effects are of14 One way of distinguishing these two views of peer effects would be to call the former the “American view” and the
latter the “European view”. More precisely, in the US there tends to be an effort to teach a relatively similar curriculum to all
ability types within the same school through the age of 18 when a sharp ability-based separation takes place, while in Europe
students are typically separated into different schools based on ability at a much earlier age and then taught very different
subjects intended to prepare them for very different tasks. Under the US system, it may well be the case that the presence of
higher ability students benefits lower ability students that are being taught similar subjects, while in Europe such mixing would
simply get in the way of the rather different missions of schools that are targeting curricula to different ability types. Some have
argued that the introduction of competition may tend to lead to a more European peer effect as schools would differentiate
themselves horizontally by targeting to different types of students. 
14
the form modeled in equation (2) where the mean of peer quality enters school production – and
where mixing of peers consequently benefits lower peer quality children at the expense of high
peer quality children. Alternatively, it may be the case that, under certain types of curriculum
arrangements, not just the mean but also the variance of peer quality is important. This form of
peer effects is incorporated into the model through the function N in Section 4.22 under the
heading of “curriculum targeting”.
14 As is illustrated in that section, the latter formulation of peer
effects tends to produce substantially more favorable impacts of vouchers on school quality.
Finally, the degree of tracking that is present in public schools clearly impacts on the way in
which peer effects matter. Although tracking is not included explicitly in the model, it should be
pointed out that – conditional on whatever level of mixing occurs in public schools  – parents
must still have preferences that place weight on peers in order for any model of this kind to
replicate private school attendance levels we actually observe in the data. Thus, the presence of
tracking would not in fact alter the initial calibration of the model, but it would cause us to
expect an increase in tracking as competition increases – a process that is modeled in Section
4.22 as an increase in curriculum targeting within public schools. 
3.2. Defining an Equilibrium in the Model
An equilibrium in the model occurs when each actor is doing the best he/she can given15
the features of the economy that can be observed, and when those features are consistent with the
underlying political and production processes. Thus, an equilibrium must specify those aspects
that everyone can see – house prices, tax rates, public and private school quality levels – and
these must be such (i)  that no private school or potential private school could increase its profits
by exiting or entering the market -- or by changing its pricing or admissions policy; (ii) that no
household wants to move and/or change schools; (iii) that all tax rates are consistent with
majority rule yielding balanced government budgets; and (iv) that public school quality in each
district arises from the inputs allocated to the public schools through the decisions of households
to attend (thus determining peer quality) and the decisions resulting from the public choice
process (which determines per pupil funding levels). While the formal definition of equilibrium
and the necessary mathematical proof of its existence is given elsewhere (Nechyba 1997a, 1999),
this section provides a brief overview of the issues involved. In essence, we can view a full
equilibrium as consisting of equilibrium in three different areas: the private school market, the
housing market and the political market. I discuss each in turn.
3.21. The Private School Market
Recall that private schools compete along two dimensions: they set both a per pupil
spending level and a minimum peer quality admissions level. The assumption of perfect
competition in the private school market then leads to a relatively straightforward private school
hierarchy. Specifically, private schools (to the extent that they exist in equilibrium) are
composed of children from the same type of household, and the tuition charged to each
household is equal to the most preferred per pupil spending level of that household. To see this,15 The equilibrium prediction of homogeneity of peer quality within each private school is, of course, somewhat
extreme and not meant to be a perfectly realistic outcome. It arises from two particular assumptions in the model. First, the
production process assumes no economies of scale in school production – thus permitting small schools in the model to arise
easily. Even if economies of scale were explicitly introduced, however, the model would still predict relative homogeneity given
the discrete number of household types, and unless such scale economies were substantially larger than is indicated by any of the
available empirical estimates, the simplifying assumption of no scale economies does not result in substantial qualitatively or
quantitatively different implications. Second, I am explicitly not allowing price discrimination within a school such as that used
in Epple and Romano (1998) and Caucutt (forthcoming). If private schools can observe peer effects, these papers have
demonstrated that pricing of these peer effects is profit maximizing and efficient – and results in a different form of cream
skimming. While it is unclear from the current empirical literature to what extent such differential pricing is actually practiced in
private schools, it is certain that at least some does indeed take place – although probably not as much as predicted by Epple and
Romano (1998). To whatever extent this would occur, some heterogeneity within private schools would, however, emerge. 
16 An observationally equivalent set of assumptions for the model employed here would be that private schools
– rather than being profit maximizers constrained to charge a single price – are exclusionary clubs of parents who agree
to an equal cost-sharing rule (Nechyba (1999)). 
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suppose either of these conditions were not satisfied in equilibrium. If the school consisted of
several types of peer groups, then a new school could enter, set a higher minimum peer
admissions level while charging the same tuition and make the same profit as the existing school.
Similarly, if tuition were greater than per pupil spending, a school with the same admissions rule
and per pupil spending level but slightly lower tuition could enter and make positive profits.
Thus, equilibrium in the private school market simply means that, if a particular household type
would demand a private school with that household’s peer quality and that household’s most
preferred level of spending, then such a private school will be available.
15 As a result of perfect
competition, private schools make zero profits.
16 
3.22. The Housing Market
When households in the model evaluate which house type (or neighborhood) in which
school district to choose, they can then check easily how much utility each option offers. For
example, in evaluating the utility from house h in district d, a household would calculate both the
utility of residing there while attending the district’s public school and the utility of residing17
there and attending the private school offered by the market (i.e. a private school with that
household’s peer quality and most preferred level of tuition). The utility household n obtains
from living in this house and attending public school is given by u(d,h,sd,cdhn) where sd is district
d’s public school quality and cdhn is the level of private consumption that is equal to household
n’s after-tax income minus the property-tax inclusive house payment required to live in house
(d,h). The utility from living in the same house and attending private school, on the other hand,
is given by  u(d,h,sn,cdhn-Jn) where sn is the private school quality offered to household n by the
market, and Jn  is the private school tuition required of household n. Thus, for a given location,
public schools have the advantage that they permit higher private consumption, while private
schools might offer higher school quality (due to their ability to tailor tuition to household
demand, due to their ability to restrict access to lower peer quality students, and –  in some
specifications of the model – due to their more efficient use of resources). 
Given house prices, tax rates and public school quality levels, a household can therefore
determine the utility of a house h in district d as simply the higher of  u(d,h,sd,cdhn) and
u(d,h,sn,cdhn-Jn). The housing market is in equilibrium (given public school quality and tax rates)
if every household chooses its most preferred location at the prevailing house prices and, as a
result, all houses are occupied. 
3.23. The Political Market and Full Equilibrium
Finally, residents of each district are assumed to vote on local property tax rates knowing
that local tax revenues, supplemented by state funds through a pre-specified state aid formula,17 In addition, a state income tax rate sufficient to fund state aid (and vouchers in later simulations) is imposed.
18 These myopia assumptions are relatively standard in the literature and roughly assume that households hold a
variety of factors fixed when voting. The assumptions essentially require voters to hold expectations that, while accurate
in equilibrium, are not accurate out of equilibrium. For details on the required voter myopia assumptions to insure this
single peakedness of preferences, see Nechyba (1999). It should also be noted, however, that single-peakedness is
actually a stronger condition than what is required for a voting equilibrium to exist when voters have a private alternative
to the publically provided service (Epple and Romano (1996), Glomm and Ravikumar (1998)), although weaker
conditions are difficult to guarantee easily within the present set-up. 
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will translate to spending on public education.
17 Alternatively, for versions of the model in which
funding of public schools is equalized and centralized, residents of all districts vote on a state
income tax rate with the understanding that revenues support equal levels of per pupil spending
in all districts. Households that send their child to public school have single peaked preferences
over property tax rates (Nechyba (1997)) as do those who send their child to private school
(Nechyba (1999)) under certain voter myopia assumptions. For any given distribution of the
population into districts, a political (voting) equilibrium therefore exists.
18 A full equilibrium is
then a partition of households into house types and school districts, a price for each house type, a
local property tax rate for each district, a state income tax rate, and an indication of who goes to
public and who goes to private school – such that private school markets, housing markets as
well as the political market are in equilibrium. 
3.3. Matching Parameters to Data
The three school districts in the model are intended to be representative of the several
hundred low income, middle income and high income school districts located in 4 New Jersey
counties (Bergen, Hudson, Essex and Union Counties) that include the suburbs of New York
City. More specifically, using 1990 School District Data Book  (National Center for Education
Statistics (1995)) and Census (Bureau of the Census (1992)) data from all districts in these four19 It is important to note that, while this implies that some low income households in the model are initially
endowed with expensive houses, this is not the case once the equilibrium has been calculated – when such houses would
have been traded at market prices. 
20 One can also interpret the correlation between parental and child income of 0.4 as an upper bound on the
correlation between parental income and child ability because of the correlation of school quality and parental
income. Sensitivity analysis with versions of the model that drive the correlation to 0, however, suggest this makes
little difference for the results I report.
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counties, school districts in these counties were divided into three categories by median
household income such that each category ends up with roughly equal numbers of households.
The features of the model to be matched to these data are: (i) the income/wealth and ability
distributions; (ii) the parameters in utility and production functions of equations (1) and (2); and
(iii) the formula of state aid that is taken as given by voters.
3.31. Income/Wealth and Ability Distributions
The simulation model begins with 20 different income levels endowed with 15 different
types of houses – yielding a total 300 different endowment or wealth levels. Incomes in the
model range from 1 (corresponding to $10,000) to 20 (corresponding to $200,000) and represent
a discretized version of the actual household income distribution in the data, and house values
(which are properly interpreted as annualized flows of housing services) range from 0.3 to 3.5.
Since income types are initially spread uniformly across the 15 house types, the addition of
housing endowments has the effect of smoothing the income distribution in the model.
19 In
addition, ability endowments take on 5 different possible discrete values which are set to range
from 1 to 10. Empirical estimates of the correlation of parental and child income of 0.4 (Solon
(1992), Zimmerman (1992)) are used as a proxy for the correlation of parental income and child
ability.
20  The addition of 5 ability endowments to the 300 income/wealth endowments then yield20
a total of 1,500 different types of households in the model.
3.32. Parameters in Utility and Production Functions
More challenging is the process of setting the parameters in the utility and production
functions. These parameters include the housing quality parameters (k11,..., kdh,...k35), the
preference parameters " and $, and the production parameter D. The methodology used to
calibrate these parameters builds on that of Nechyba (1997b,2000a) and is outlined more fully in
Nechyba (2000b).  The method  translates a near-continuum of house qualities observed for each
district type into 5 discrete quality intervals (neighborhoods) of equal sizes. It starts by assuming
an underlying utility function u(h,s,c) = h
*s
"c
$ where h jointly captures housing and
neighborhood quality and is interpreted as the annualized flow of housing/neighborhood










where q is equal to peer quality and (=q
D". When treating h, x and c as choice variables in an
ordinary maximization problem, the exponents *, (1-D)", and $ can then, without loss of
generality, be normalized to sum to 1 and interpreted as budget shares. Thus, I calculate the
budget shares for h, x and c for a hypothetical “median household” that consumes the imputed
median annualized flow of housing/neighborhood services (in the data),  earns the median
income and “chooses” the mean school spending level observed in the New Jersey districts, and
these budget shares become our estimates of *, (1-D)", and $ (equal to 0.22, 0.12 and 0.6521 Given data on house prices rather than flows of housing services, the median annualized flow of
housing/neighborhood services is calculated for the median house value in the data assuming a 5.5% interest rate.
22 More precisely, suppose that for houses in districts falling into district category 3 (i.e. “high income
districts”), the annualized flow of housing services for a house at the 50
th percentile of the distribution is 1.5
(corresponding to $15,000). The housing quality parameter for neighborhood 3 (the “median neighborhood”) in district 3
is then just equal to (1.5)
*, i.e. k23 = (1.5)
* = (1.5)
0.22 = 1.093. This procedure is then similarly applied to other district
types to arrive at housing quality parameters for all neighborhoods in all representative districts. These parameters are
reported in Nechyba (2000b).
23 It should be noted, however, that these neighborhood quality measures are assumed to stay constant
throughout the policy simulations. This implies that, while the benchmark equilibrium presented below accurately
captures current neighborhood externalities, the simulations do not allow for a change in these externalities as
populations migrate. However, as I have argued elsewhere (Nechyba (2000)) and will argue again below, this actually
implies that the migration results highlighted in the paper are understated and would likely be stronger if neighborhood




Of course, housing in the model is not a continuous variable h but rather consists of a
discrete number of house/neighborhood quality levels denoted by (k11,..., kdh,...k35) in equation
(1). I therefore combine the housing value distribution data from the School District Data Book
with our estimate for * to calibrate the fifteen values for kdh across the three representative school
districts. In particular, I take the housing distribution for all houses in districts of a particular






th percentile (corresponding to neighborhoods 1 through 5 in district 1) and convert
these to annualized housing flows (using a 5.5% interest rate). I then combine these annualized
flow values with the exponent * to arrive at the five housing (or neighborhood) quality
parameters for this representative district.
22 As noted in an earlier section, this methodology –
because it employs all the information contained in housing prices –  is quite general in that it
incorporates not just house quality measures but also non-school related neighborhood
amentities and non-school related peer effects into the kdh quality parameters.
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Finally, while the calibration procedure above has placed a restriction on the values of D22
and " (given that (1-D)" = 0.12 from the budget share exercise), the precise values of D and " are
set to match private school attendance rates. Recall from equation (2) that D is the weight on peer
quality (as opposed to per pupil spending) in the school production function. When D is set to 0,
school quality differences are determined solely by per pupil spending differences which, in this
model, yields zero private school attendance even if private school vouchers are introduced at
relatively high levels. On the other hand, if D is set close to 1, public schools cannot survive even
without private school vouchers. As D rises from 0 to 1, private school attendance increases
monotonically, and D is set so as to replicate as closely as possible the level of private school
attendance observed in the data (yielding D = 0.475). Given the restriction that (1-D)" = 0.12, this
also determines the value of " (= 0.229). When an additional efficiency advantage of private
schools is introduced in section 4.22 through the function N, D is adjusted (downward) so as to
continue to allow the model to accurately predict private school attendance rates. 
3.33. State Aid Formula
As argued in MaCurdy and Nechyba (2001), it is difficult to construct state aid formulae
from statutory language because of the fungibility of aid and the subtle tradeoffs that local policy
makers are aware of but that are unobservable to the outsider. Rather than attempting to mimic a
statutory formula, I therefore implement a state aid formula that combines block grant and
matching grant elements (as defined in Nechyba (1996)) in such a way as to allow the model to
replicate the levels of per pupil spending observed in the data. 
3.4. The Calibrated New Jersey Equilibrium 23
With the distributional properties and functional parameters chosen, the computer model
is then asked to generate an equilibrium. If the calibration is successful, the stylized facts in the
data should be approximately replicated by the computer simulation. Table 1 provides numbers
for key equilibrium values generated by the computer model when N=1, and Table 2 translates
these to be comparable to the numbers in the data employed to calibrate the model. Overall, the
match between the predicted values from the computer model and those found in the data seems
reasonably close (with some exceptions). The remaining simulations then employ the same
income/wealth/ability distributions for the 1,500 household types, and the same parameters for
utility and production functions (with adjustments made only to D as N is altered in Section
4.22). The New Jersey specific state-aid formula, however, is not employed in all simulations as
some are intended to reflect results in more stylized state financed or locally financed systems.
 
4.  Policy Simulations
Two types of predictions arise from the policy simulations reported in this section: (1) A
substantial portion of the current level of income-based residential segregation can be attributed
to the limits on competition inherent in the current public school system, and the fostering of
additional private school choice has the potential to dramatically reduce this kind of segregation.
This prediction is robust to the inclusion of various controversial assumptions regarding other
forces unleashed by increased competition. (2) On the other hand, assumptions regarding the
impact of competition on school behavior do matter for predicting the degree to which increased
competition from private schools may impact school quality. Such policies may create winners24
and losers while leaving average school quality roughly unchanged, or they may create
substantial increases in school quality. Section 4.1 focuses on the first of these predictions, while
Section 4.2 discusses the second.  
4.1. Public Schools, Residential Segregation and Private School Choice
It is apparent, both in the data as well as the benchmark equilibrium (that is relatively
consistent with the data) that there is a substantial degree of residential segregation by income
across school districts. Given the inter-district distribution of housing quality, this is of course no
surprise. The simulation results reported in this section, however, suggest an additional role
played by the rules inherent in different types of schools systems, and they suggest a large
potential for private school vouchers to change the degree of residential segregation. In Section
4.11, I begin by investigating the school-related causes of segregation in the absence of
vouchers, and Section 4.12 builds on these intuitions and investigates the role of vouchers.
4.11. The Role of Private and Public Schools without Vouchers
The results of five simulations are reported in the five rows of Table 3. The first row
establishes a benchmark for the degree of residential segregation implied simply by the housing
market absent any distortion through the public school sector. This is accomplished by setting
public school spending to zero in all districts, thus causing all households in the model to choose
private schools. Housing price differences now reflect solely the house/neighborhood quality
differences embodied in the kdh values in equation (1), and no public choices regarding schooling
interfere with where households choose to live. 25
Next, the second row reports simulation results in which private schools are prohibited
and all public schools are financed at the local level through a local property tax. The difference
is striking:  the residence-based public school system (in the absence of private schools)
introduces a substantial degree of segregation as evidenced in both average incomes and average
property values across the three districts. For instance, the ratio of average income in district 3 to
average income in district 1 rises from 2.62 to 4.87, and the ratio of average property values in
district 3 over those in district 1 rises from 1.68 to 3.86. Capitalization of public schools (which
is absent in row 1 but not row 2) raises average housing values in the wealthy district by nearly
50 percent while lowering them in the poor district by similar magnitudes. 
One natural reaction to this comparison might be to suspect that the dramatic difference
in the first two rows of the table is due to the decentralized nature of public school financing in
the second row. Row 3 therefore reports simulation results from a state-income tax supported
equalized public school system, with private schools again prohibited. Somewhat surprisingly,
the results are rather similar to those of the second row – implying that the increase in
segregation from row 1 to row 2 is due primarily to the switch from a purely private to a purely
public system and only secondarily due to the level of decentralization of public financing. 
Finally, rows 4 and 5 repeat the previous two simulations but this time permit the
emergence of a private school market. Again, the results are striking: Not only does the
emergence of the private school market alleviate the segregation observed in the purely public
systems, it actually produces less income segregation than exists in the purely private system
where public schools played no role in where households chose to reside. Given that public
school quality continues to increase with community wealth, however, capitalization of school24 These capitalization differences appear even higher in the last column (under state funding) for reasons
addressed elsewhere (Nechyba (2000b)).
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differences must -- and does -- persist in equilibrium. Thus, under local public financing,
capitalization still raises average property values in district 3 by 11 percent and lowers them in
district 1 by 28 percent.
24 This yields the curious outcome that the district 3 to district 1 ratio of
average district income actually falls below the pure private simulations (row 1), but the similar
ratio of average property values settles well above the pure private benchmark (row 1). 
These seemingly contradictory results on income segregation and capitalization,
however, are closely linked. Consider a relatively high income household that resides in district
3 under both the purely public and the purely private systems. Under the public system the
household chooses district 3 because this is the only way to consume high quality education.
Under the private system, on the other hand, there is no reason for a household to choose any
particular district -- the only factor that matters is housing/neighborhood quality. When a private
market is introduced into a public system, however, an important effect emerges for households
considering private schooling: the difference in public school quality is capitalized into house
prices (albeit at a lesser rate than under pure public financing), thus making the same house (if it
exists in both districts) substantially cheaper in the poor district than in the rich district.  In the
case of local public financing, this results in an average price difference of approximately 40%
for the same type of house in district 3 versus district 1. Unlike the case of a purely private
system, this capitalization of public school differences then gives rise to rather strong incentives
for those choosing private schools to choose a house in the poor district -- even if that house is of
sub-optimal quality. Households with high ability children receive the biggest payoff from
opting out of the public system, as do middle to high income households. Thus, the introduction25 A cautionary note is perhaps in order: While the results in Table 3 suggest that segregation would be greater
in a purely private system than in mixed private/public system, it would be stretching the bounds of the model to take this
implication too literally. Specifically, linking public schooling to housing for decades causes housing stocks to evolve
endogenously, while private schooling introduces no such distortions. Since housing is fixed at its present quality levels
in this paper, the model cannot be used to infer where the segregation would have ended up under public versus private
financing. Rather, the model suggests that, conditional on housing markets fixed at present levels and not being allowed
to change, a purely private system would lead to higher levels of income segregation.
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of private schools into a public system – whether state or locally financed – provides incentives
to middle and high income families (with high ability children) to settle in poor districts. As a
result, average income differences narrow substantially more than property value differences that
continue to capitalize public school quality.
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4.12. Vouchers and Segregation
Tables 4a-c report simulation results for three different public school finance regimes
(local, state and the system calibrated to the New Jersey data) and three types of vouchers: the
top portion of each table simulates vouchers that are universally available; the middle portion
simulates vouchers targeted only to residents of district 1; and the lowest portion reports results
from the introduction of vouchers targeted only to households earning below $25,000. Vouchers
simply allow eligible households to redeem the face value for that level of private school tuition,
and they can freely supplement the voucher amount.
The impact of private school vouchers on segregation then follows straightforwardly
from the logic behind the previous results. To the extent that a voucher causes someone who
previously chose public schools to switch to private schools, the same price incentive to settle in
the poor rather than the rich district applies. At the same time, however, inter-district housing
price differences narrow as more households choose private schools in poor districts and as
voucher levels increase the value of housing in those districts. Thus two opposing effects emerge26 If vouchers were to get high enough to cause all public schools to collapse, the degree of residential
segregation would settle to what appears in the purely private system in row 1 of Table 3.
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as vouchers are introduced: First, the capitalization induced price incentive for private school
attending households to reside in poorer communities applies to a larger number of households,
thus causing households with incomes above the average for district 1 to immigrate and raise
average income. Second, this price incentive declines as housing price differences narrow and as
only lower quality housing remains for private school immigrants in district 1 – thus causing
lower income households with high ability children to compose the additional private school
attending population. Since vouchers are taken up primarily by households that are not at the
lowest end of the income distribution, however, these effects are either absent or modest when
vouchers are small in size and/or targeted only to low income households (as opposed to low
income districts). 
First, consider the top portions of the tables 4a-c (which do not restrict voucher
eligibility). For low levels of such vouchers the first effect dominates – thus causing decreases in
income segregation as households with incomes above district 1's average immigrate to take
advantage of lower house prices while sending their children to private school. For higher levels
of such vouchers, on the other hand, the second effect dominates – thus causing increases in
income segregation.
26 The impact of universally available vouchers on income segregation is,
therefore, U-shaped in the size of the voucher. 
Now consider the middle parts of Tables 4a-c -- results for vouchers targeted solely to
residents of district 1. For such vouchers, it appears that the second effect never materializes.
Since vouchers are available only to residents in district 1, migration of private school attending
households into district 1 continues despite the fact that price differences are narrowing, with29
higher income immigrants out-competing others for the houses that ensure voucher eligibility
despite the fact that some of these houses are not of high quality. In the middle portions of
Tables 4a-c, income segregation therefore continues to decline as houses in district 1 become
increasingly valuable to those interested in private education. At the $5,000 voucher level, the
decline in segregation is most dramatic, with district 3 average income now only 20 percent
higher than district 1 average income for the local financing simulation and property values
(despite higher housing quality) only 5 percent higher. 
Both types of vouchers – those that are not targeted and those targeted to the poorest
district –  therefore can reduce segregation. However, universally available vouchers – by
privatizing the system at high enough voucher levels – eventually lead to the level of segregation
that would occur in a purely private system (which is higher than the segregation in the present
mixed system). For universally available vouchers, residential income de-segregation then
occurs only at lower levels of vouchers. Vouchers targeted to poor districts, on the other hand,
have the potential to increase significantly these de-segregating effects by preventing a complete
privatization of the public system but rather making the poor district increasingly attractive to
those seeking private education at high voucher levels. 
Finally, the lowest portions of Tables 4a-c report simulation results for vouchers targeted
only to households that earn below $25,000 per year. These households can be grouped into two
broad conceptual categories – those that have high ability children and those that have low
ability children. Whatever migration is caused by such vouchers is then primarily migration of
relatively low income families (who are eligible for the voucher) with high ability children that
locate in the poor district and send their children to private schools. As a consequence, relatively27 It should be noted that, in voucher experiments in some cities, the demand for low levels of vouchers targeted to low
income families has been higher than predicted here. Since the “low income district” in this model is an aggregation of the
lowest one third of all districts, the model clearly does not capture desperate conditions in the worst public schools and thus  the
demand for vouchers in such districts. It is in such primarily inner city districts, however, that voucher demand by low income
families has been surprisingly high even when voucher levels were relatively low. We should therefore expect voucher take-up
rates for low levels of vouchers targeted to the poor in very poor districts to be higher than what is predicted by this model. 
30
little change in the degree of inter-district income segregation arises (with the ratio of average
income in district 3 to average income in district 1 falling by a modest 5 to 10 percent for high
levels of the voucher). Furthermore, the voucher is actually not used until it reaches at least the
$2,500 level.
27  Cases between universally available vouchers and household targeted vouchers
of the kind modeled here are of course also possible – and results for such vouchers fall
predictably between those reported in the top and bottom portions of the table. For instance,
vouchers might be set high for low income households and phased out as incomes rise. This
would then introduce some (but not all) of the migration forces unleashed by universally
available vouchers. 
Finally, it should be noted that the assumption that housing quality is fixed (i.e. kdh’s do
not change) tends to bias the mobility results emphasized in this section downward. In the
discussion of the calibration of the model, for instance, I emphasized that the methodology
(using housing prices) employed to calibrate house/neighborhood quality parameters
incorporates not just housing quality but also non-school related neighborhood amenities and
externalities. Holding the kdh parameters fixed as migration takes place then assumes that
housing qualities as well as non-school related neighborhood amenities and externalities are also
unchanged. Since the migration that takes place primarily involves relatively higher income
households moving from middle and high income districts to the low income district, one would
expect kdh values to increase in district 1 (as these households expand houses and add to31
neighborhood amenities and externalities) and to decrease in district 3 (as the converse happens
there). This would make district 1 even more attractive – thus causing even less segregation and
a further narrowing of property values. Thus, the explicit exclusion of adjustments in the kdh
values yields lower mobility results than what the model would otherwise tend to predict. 
4.2 School Choice and School Quality
Previous models of vouchers have ignored the implications of voucher policies on
residential mobility and have instead focused on single community settings in which private
schools compete with a homogeneous public school sector. The purpose of these models is to
study the effect of vouchers on average school quality as well as the distribution of school
quality across different types of students, and to investigate the likely workings of private school
markets in a voucher environment. The problem with comparing pre- and post-voucher outcomes
within single-district models of this kind, however, is that they abstract away from one of the
defining characteristics of the U.S. public school system – the degree of inequality in existing
public schools – and thus analyze the issue of vouchers from an empirically incorrect
benchmark. We therefore now re-visit the competition forces analyzed in single district models
here in the context of the multi-district model with heterogeneous public schools. 
These competition forces are of two general kinds: first, it is argued by voucher
opponents, a policy of private school vouchers will drain the public system of resources and thus
leave it worse off. The term “resources” needs to be interpreted loosely to include not only28 If the voucher amount is below per pupil spending in the public school, then, assuming no change in overall
government spending on education (including spending on vouchers), per pupil spending in public school would increase
as students depart with vouchers. If vouchers also go to those currently attending private schools, then the increase in per
pupil spending would occur only if the number of student departing the public system is sufficiently large.
29 Chubb and Moe (1990), for instance, argue such points, as do others. 
30 Manski (1992) formalizes this type of tradeoff in a single district context. Epple and Romano (1998) and
Caucutt (forthcoming) add a different type of efficiency gain when they allow private schools to price peer externalities --
a point I do not investigate here.
32
financial resources (which may in fact increase on a per pupil basis
28) but also peer quality
(including whatever part of peer quality is due to parental involvement (McMillan (1999)) and
political support. Second, it is argued by proponents of vouchers, the increased competition for
students will lead to greater effort by public schools and that the greater variety of education
options will lead to a better matching of resources with student needs.
29 The loss of resources
would, of course, lead to a decline in public school quality, while the competition-induced
efficiency gains through more efficient resource uses and better matching of resources with
students would lead to an increase.
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Section 4.21 begins with the version of the model (outlined in Section 3) that
incorporates only the first of these forces – i.e. the cream-skimming by private schools of top
students from the public schools. Again, three types of vouchers are analyzed: universally
available vouchers, vouchers targeted only to residents of district 1, and vouchers targeted to the
poorest families (i.e. those earning below $25,000 per year). Naturally, without the second
counteracting force, the presence of just private school cream skimming implies that vouchers
will have a tendency to lower public school quality, although -- perhaps surprisingly -- not
always and not primarily in the district in which vouchers are being taken up. Section 4.22 then
considers two types of potential efficiency-enhancing forces resulting from increased31 The differences and similarities between district targeted and universal vouchers are discussed in detail in
Nechyba (2000a). That paper also demonstrates formally the clear intuition emerging from the exercise that household-
income targeting has significantly different policy implications than district targeting – again because of the mobility
forces that arise in a multi-district public school environment. I return to this point in Section 6.
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competition – forces that will tend to produce results more favorable for those interested in
promoting vouchers. 
4.21. School Quality in the Absence of School Responses to Competition
Tables 5a-c present public school variables as well as private school attendance rates for
each of the districts under different levels of the three types of vouchers for different public
school funding systems (local, state and a system calibrated to New Jersey). The cream
skimming effect of private schools is evident in the peer quality columns of these tables: higher
peer quality students tend to leave the public school system as vouchers are introduced, thus
decreasing the average peer quality in the public sector. However, because of the mobility forces
described above, the declines in public school peer quality are not as concentrated in school
districts that experience a decline in public school enrollment and an increase in private school
attendance. Rather, private schools are drawing high peer quality students from all public
schools even though marginal private school attending households reside in poorer districts as a
result of moving to take advantage of more favorable housing prices. For the same reason,
vouchers targeted to the poor district have impacts similar to untargeted vouchers so long as
voucher levels are modest – i.e. since marginal households who take up vouchers tend to move
to the better neighborhoods in the poor district, the targeted nature of the voucher is relatively
non-binding as long as voucher levels are not too high.
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Whether or not public school quality declines, however, depends on whether or not the34
declines in average peer quality are offset by increases in per pupil spending. In Table 5a (under
local financing), public school quality shrinks relatively uniformly in all three districts whereas
in Table 5b (under state financing), public school quality is relatively unchanged in all districts
(until voucher levels become high). The intuition for these results is straightforward: As
vouchers push high peer quality households into private schools, the political constituency for
public school funding declines. At the same time, the exit of some into the private sector implies
that those remaining in public schools now receive more per pupil funding for any given tax rate
-- i.e. voting for public school spending has just become cheaper. The first effect causes the
median voter to – all else being equal – prefer less public school spending, while the second
effect causes him to prefer more. Under state funding, the latter effect outweighs the former –
causing increases in per pupil funding in public schools as voucher levels increase. The
argument that vouchers result in a decrease in public school resources therefore holds only for
peer quality and not for school spending once the political economy forces are taken into account
under state financing -- and the net effect is relatively unchanged public school quality. In Table
5a, on the other hand, public school quality in the poor district falls because per pupil spending is
determined by the constitutional minimum rather than the median voter -- and thus does not
change to offset the decrease in peer quality. Effects in the other districts differ -- some
experiencing an increase in quality and others a decrease. Finally, Table 5c presents school
outcomes for the New Jersey calibrated state funding system – a hybrid system that includes both
local and state funding. Implications for public school quality are closer to those under the state
system – primarily because of the fact that state aid in New Jersey insures that the poor district is
not at some constitutionally minimum spending level but rather determined in a local public35
choice equilibrium. Only when more than fifty percent of the population attends private school
in the poor district does public school quality suffer considerably.
Including both the multi-district nature of public schools as well as a political economy
model for the setting of public school spending therefore casts doubt on the common perception
emerging from single-district, non-political economy models that public schools are bound to
decline in quality unless competition itself produces considerable efficiency gains. Here, the two
additions to the model undo much of the negative effect of cream skimming private schools by
allowing those remaining in the public school system to free ride on the contributions of others
and to benefit from mobility forces that insure declines in peer quality will not be concentrated in
only those districts that experience the biggest declines in public school attendance. While the
model certainly does not rule out the possibility that public schools will suffer in the absence of
competitive efficiency gains, it does suggest this effect to be smaller and less concentrated than
one might have imagined. Variances in school outcomes (not reported in the tables) similarly do
not change significantly. 
4.22. School Quality when Public Schools Respond to Competition
The simulation results in the absence of a competitive efficiency effect can then serve as
a benchmark, and any efficiency enhancing impact of competition would be expected to improve
the impact of vouchers (as in the single-district models (Manski (1992)). Efficiency enhancing
effects could in principle come in many forms, but I focus in this section on two types of
possible competition-induced changes in the production relationship. Essentially, the production
function has two inputs, and competition could impact either one of these. In the case of peer32 This constant is N = (1-81*variance) for all schools, where 81 is calibrated jointly with D to match private
school attendance rates in the absence of vouchers. Given zero variance in peer quality for private schools, the private
school production function is effectively unchanged by this – i.e. N=1 in equilibrium for all private schools.
33 This constant is N = (1-82*PUB
2) for public schools and N=1 for private schools, where PUB is the fraction of
the population attending public schools and 82 is calibrated jointly with D to match private school attendance rates in the
absence of vouchers.
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quality, we have assumed thus far that only average peer quality matters. It is conceivable,
however, that the variance matters as well. If two schools are identical in every way (i.e. average
peer quality and average spending) except that school A has a greater variance in peer quality
than school B, school B may well be able to more effectively target its resources to the student
population’s needs because those needs are more uniform across the student population. I will
refer to this effect as curriculum targeting. In the case of spending, on the other hand, it is often
argued that the marginal product of a dollar of spending will rise in public schools as those
schools face greater competition. This effect will be referred to as competitive efficiency gain.
Each of these effects is included in separate simulations reported below.
More precisely, Tables 6a-c present simulation results for universal, district-targeted and
household-targeted vouchers respectively, for both the case of curriculum targeting and
competitive efficiency gains. The curriculum targeting effect is modeled as a constant N in front
of the school production function (2) that declines as the variance of peer quality increases,
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while the competitive efficiency effect is modeled as a similar constant in the public school
production function that rises in the percentage of private school attendance in all three districts
combined.
33 Both of these changes in production functions affect only public schools, but each
does so in a different way. The curriculum targeting is public school specific in that it affects the
production functions in different districts differently as school population variances changed. The
competitive gain, on the other hand, affects all public school production functions similarly in34 The 8 constants in the curriculum targeting and the competitive gain formulations of production functions can
of course be set at various levels and thus introduce competitive effects of various magnitudes. As alluded to earlier, the
re-calibration requires primarily a change in the value D – the strength of the peer quality as opposed to spending in
production. More precisely, for any 8 constant that is chosen for either the curriculum targeting or the competitive gain
specification, public school quality falls while private school quality remains constant. In order to maintain benchmark
levels of private school attendance, this requires lowering the value of peer quality in production – the factor that gives
private school their other competitive advantage. There is, however, an upper bound to how high 8 can be and still
produce only modest private school attendance levels in the absence of vouchers. The simulations reported here set the 8
constants in both the curriculum targeting and the competitive gain specification of production processes to be the
midpoint between this upper bound and the lower bound of zero.
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that it provides an overall measure of the competitive pressures faced by the public system. These
changes of course require re-calibrations of various parameters of the model in order to replicate
something close to the benchmark quantities in Table 2. For the sake of brevity, I forego a
detailed discussion of this calibration process and instead simply note that the size of the two
types of public school responses modeled in the simulations I report represents the midpoint of a
feasible range of such effects.
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Table 6a focuses on curriculum targeting where improvements in public school production
processes hinge on each school’s variance in peer quality. Since migration patters are similar to
those discussed in Section 4.1, this effect is most pronounced in district 1 which experiences the
greatest decline in student population and with it the greatest increase in peer quality
homogeneity. As a result, public school quality rises most in district 1, although other districts
experience a narrowing of the variance in their student population as well even though the total
population in those schools does not decrease by as much. Average private school quality falls
with increasing private school enrollment as the marginal private school choosers have lower peer
quality and thus enjoy lower private school quality. And, while those switching to private schools
increase the overall variance in school outcomes, those remaining in public schools now
experience higher school quality and thus bring about a counteracting narrowing in the overall38
variance of outcomes. Finally, since the public school responds under these simulations, private
school attendance does not rise as fast with increases in voucher amounts as it does in previous
simulations without competitive effects. Results are similar for district targeted vouchers (Table
6b) as they are for universal vouchers, although private school take-up rates are predictably
smaller when eligibility is restricted solely to one district. Similar forces also operate in Table 6c
for household-targeted vouchers, although changes are modes (or absent for low levels of
vouchers) given the limited impact on migration discussed in the previous section. 
The lower portions of Tables 6a-c offer simulation results under the assumption of a
competitive effect. Here, the effect on public school production functions is the same across all
public schools as the competitive pressure on the entire public school system is modeled rather
than school specific effects (as under curriculum targeting). Thus, improvements in public schools
are more uniform across all districts, and private school take-up rates are lower. Again, for the
same reasons as under curriculum targeting, average private school quality falls as more
households choose private schools. And the overall variance in educational outcomes falls
slightly. A comparison of results for targeted versus universal vouchers gives rise predictable
differences in take-up rates under higher levels of the voucher. 
The broad conclusion regarding school quality under vouchers in this model is then that
the impact on average educational opportunities as well as the variance in such opportunities
depends on what assumptions are made regarding the responses by public schools. In the base
case in which cream skimming by private schools was permitted but no competitive response on
the part of public schools was assumed, average public school quality remains relatively constant
under some public financing and declines slightly under others (unless voucher levels become35 Overall average quality, including private schools, was not reported but stays relatively constant or rises in
the benchmark cases. Overall variances rise as well.




35 When different types of competitive effects are included, on the other hand, both
average public school quality and overall average school quality can rise substantially, and the
variance in outcomes may drop somewhat. Impacts tend to be strongest for vouchers that induce
large migrations, which occurs under both universally available vouchers and even more so under
district targeted voucher. Such migrations are, however, significantly more muted when vouchers
are targeted to low income households.
4.3. Robustness of Results on Segregation and School Quality
Finally, we return to the issue of residential segregation. In Section 4.1, it was
demonstrated that residential segregation can be affected significantly by the introduction of
vouchers, especially vouchers targeted to poor districts. These results were arrived at in
simulations that ignored any potential competitive effects. Table 7 then provides comparisons of
indicators of residential segregation for both centralized and decentralized public school systems
when the two types of competitive effects we introduced in Section 4.2 are included. These
results indicate that the segregation effects raised in Section 4.1 are robust to the inclusion of such
effects.
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5. Empirical Foundation and Testable Implications
The simulations reported in Section 4, and the model structure of Section 3 that gives rise37 Without heterogeneity in preferences, this model results in perfect stratification of incomes across districts
(Epple, Filimon and Romer (1993)).
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to these simulation results, offer a variety of predictions regarding the policy impact of expanded
private school choice. While it is difficult to test these predictions directly (due to the current lack
of a sufficiently large policy experiment of this kind in the U.S.), the model itself does have
testable implications that can be analyzed with current data, and some of the key foundations of
the model can be empirically challenged. This section provides a brief discussion of both the
empirical foundations and the testable implications arising from the model, and some of the
available empirical evidence that speaks to these.
5.1. Foundations of the Model: Tastes, Housing Markets, and Mobility
In arriving at a model that has the potential to replicate both the current inter-district
differences in public school quality and the heterogeneity of income and property values within
jurisdictions, two possible avenues are available to the economic theorist: First, he could model
the outcome as a result of taste differences, where household tastes differ over housing and/or
school quality, and both high and low income households settle in jurisdictions with similar
school quality as a result.
37 This approach is put forth by Epple and Platt (1998), empirically
implemented by Epple and Sieg (1999) and will henceforth be called the Epple-Platt-Sieg (EPS)
approach. A second alternative approach -- and the one taken in this paper -- is to assume that
households share preferences but the housing market, whether because of zoning regulations or
historical evolution, offers only a limited bundles of school quality/housing combinations. In
particular, this approach assumes that low quality housing is relatively more concentrated in some
districts, which then results endogenously in relatively worse public schools in those districts.38 Recent expositions of this debate can be found in Fischel (forthcoming) and Zodrow (forthcoming). 
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Both approaches can be reconciled with the data, but both contain underlying assumptions that
are problematic for policy analysis. Below we discuss several of these as they relate to some other
literatures.
5.11. Housing Markets
The EPS approach  treats housing as a good similar to other types of goods in that, at any
particular location, consumption of the good can be changed in either direction as conditions
change. From the urban economics literature we know, of course, that housing is a rather durable
good, and while it is often possible to increase housing quantity and/or quality at a particular
location, it is not similarly possible to decrease these (except through depreciation in the long
run). The approach taken in this paper, on the other hand, models housing as entirely fixed and
thus does not permit quality improvements of the kind that might be made under certain policy
changes while precluding the unrealistic decreases in housing quantity allowed under the EPS
model. Thus, one model seems to err in the direction of allowing too many types of changes in
housing consumption at a particular location while the other errs in the direction of permitting too
few.
Empirical discussion of this issue is primarily embedded in the literature on local property
taxation, with the “New View” of the property tax arguing for the EPS model of housing markets
and the “Benefit View” arguing for a model similar to that in this paper.
38 As a result, the New39 For a discussion of the difficulty in finding testable implications that distinguish between these views, see
Nechyba (forthcoming). 
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View suggests that taxation of residential property is primarily taxation of all forms of capital as
higher property taxes simply imply a fleeing of capital from housing to other uses, while the
Benefit View argues that the local property tax, through both direct payments and capitalization
effects, approximates a local benefits tax. Unfortunately, different versions of both these views
are difficult to empirically distinguish, and much of the debate therefore centers on the degree to
which zoning in fact keeps housing stocks at particular locations fixed. Thus, the literature offers
little guidance as to which model is more “correct”.
39 
For purposes of analyzing the forces discussed in this paper, however, the latter approach
has one distinct advantage over the EPS approach. First, to whatever extent a bias in the policy
prediction is introduced, it is predictable that the bias is in the direction of making the forces
weaker rather than stronger. In particular, the model predicts that vouchers, by disentangling
housing and schooling choices and resulting in various general equilibrium price effects, will tend
to cause middle to high income households to settle in poorer districts to send their children to
private schools. High quality housing in these districts is, of course, limited, and were these
migrants to change housing stocks, they would be likely to improve them. This additional
flexibility would cause migration forces to become more pronounced, thus causing predictions
regarding mobility to represent a conservative lower bound. It is not clear that a similar direction
for the bias introduced by the EPS housing model could be determined were a similar policy
exercise undertaken in such a model. In addition, the model employed in this paper allows for a
calibration of housing quality to include various other neighborhood features (through the use of
market prices in the calibration exercise) even though it then holds these features fixed as policies40 In the absence of such heterogeneity in tastes, households segregate perfectly into districts (Epple, Filimon
and Romer (1993). 
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change. But here again the assumption of fixed neighborhood features biases the predictions
downward by not allowing middle to high income immigrants to low income districts to improve
local neighborhoods in ways other than schooling.
5.12. Differences in Tastes
Second, because of the perfect flexibility of housing choices at each location, the EPS
model requires preferences to vary in order to generate heterogeneity of household income and
house prices within districts.
40 Since housing markets themselves are calibrated to yield this
within-district heterogeneity in this paper, no heterogeneity in tastes is required. While taste
heterogeneity could easily be introduced into the model used in this paper, it is preferable of
course not to do so unless it is either necessary in order for the model to match the important
features of the data or unless there is strong empirical evidence suggesting how such
heterogeneity should be introduced. The empirical literature in this area is still evolving, although
recent work by Bayer (1999) suggests that the hypothesis of persistent taste differences for
education in different income or racial/ethnic groups can be largely rejected.
5.13. Mobility and School Choice
Much of what is reported in this paper would be of little value if school choice and
residential choice were not indeed closely linked. But the empirical evidence in this regard is
overwhelming (and discussed in part earlier in the paper). Capitalization studies, starting with
Oates (1969) and continuing with recent papers such as Black (1999) have consistently confirmed41 The state of Florida began assigning grades to school in order to determine who qualifies for school-targeted
vouchers under the new state-wide voucher initiative. Figlio and Lucas demonstrate the immediacy with which seemingly
new information that is revealed affects prices, and how these prices change as additional information becomes available.
42 See Nechyba and Strauss (1998) and references therein as well as Bayer (1999).
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the importance school quality in housing prices – thus providing evidence that housing choices
are based in part on perceptions of local public schools. Even more recently, Figlio and Lucas
(2000) provide fascinating evidence of how quickly this process happens as perceptions of public
school quality change when new information is provided.
41 Similarly, discrete choice studies have
linked residential location choices more directly to the costs of living in particular school districts
and the benefits from local public school quality.
42 The notion that households consider school
quality when choosing residences is therefore rather uncontroversial, and the model in this paper
simply assumes that this consideration of school quality does not change under new policy
regimes. The only remaining issue is the speed with which it is reasonable to assume mobility to
play out, an issue difficult to analyze in the static model of this paper. It is unlikely, for instance,
that households would respond immediately by changing residences, but with mobility rates (for
non-school related reasons) as high as they are in the U.S., the process may be shorter than
otherwise expected.
5.2. Testable Implications
Section 5.1 was concerned with direct challenges to the foundations of the model
underlying the simulation results. We now turn to consider more directly the testable implications
of this model. A variety of such implications regarding mobility, segregation, private school
formation and school quality changes from increased choice policies arise from the simulations in45
Section 4, but these cannot be tested directly without a large policy experiment. Several other
related implications, however, are testable and are discussed below.
5.21. Voting on Voucher Initiatives
The model has rather straightforward predictions regarding the distribution of benefits
from voucher policies. Benefits arise in two areas: First, households with high peer quality can
more easily improve the school quality of their children by choosing private schools, and other
households may benefit from better public schools if a competitive effect of the types
incorporated into some simulations arises. Second, every household – whether in the public or
private system – is affected through changes in household wealth as housing prices change
dramatically. Results from the model suggest that, for most households the latter effect may
outweigh the former – at least for versions of the model that do not include a large competitive
efficiency improvement from increased choice. More precisely, the model predicts that
homeowners in good public school districts will tend to experience large capital losses while
homeowners in poor school districts will tend to experience large capital gains. 
The empirical implication for homeowners is therefore straightforward: One would expect
support for broad based private school vouchers to vary inversely with local public school quality.
Of course a similar implication for homeowners arises from a different model that simply
generates a greater desire for vouchers in districts with worse public schools as parents in those
districts are more dissatisfied with public education. The two models can be empirically
distinguished, however, by drawing a distinction between renters and owners who are similarly
affected by public schools but differently affected by changes in property values. In particular,46
renters in poor school districts would be adversely affected by higher rents resulting from
vouchers under the model in this paper, while renters in good school districts would benefit from
lower rents. At the same time, renters and homeowners go to the same public schools and thus
would not differ in their support for vouchers under the alternative model.
Thus, the testable implication arising from this model is that renters and homeowners will
differ in their support for vouchers, with homeowners in good districts opposing vouchers due to
the fear of capital losses and homeowners in poor districts favoring vouchers due to anticipated
capital gains. Renters would be expected to exhibit the reverse preferences, with those in good
school districts looking forward to lower rents and those in poor districts anticipating higher
rents. These implications are formalized by Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2000) and tested for
the case of the California state-wide voucher initiative that was defeated in the election of 1994.
Their results point to a strong and statistically significant difference in precincts along the lines
consistent with the predictions of this paper.
5.22. Residential Location, School Choice and Family Size
Although the model assumes each family has a single child, the implications of the model
for families with different numbers of children is straightforward but, to my knowledge, remains
untested. In particular, the choice of private school is one that brings with it a relatively constant
marginal cost per child, while this may not be the case for the choice of high quality public
schools to which a family can gain access by residing in that school’s district. A family with three
children, for instance, must pay roughly the same private school tuition for each of its children if
private schools are chosen, while the same family pays a lump sum “capitalization fee” when43 In principle this can also be tested and, were it not the case, the implication would run in the opposite
direction.
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choosing a house in the good public school district. Of course house size also increases with
family size, and thus the marginal cost of sending an additional child to public school is not zero.
Nevertheless, it is likely to be less than private school tuition,
43 giving the implication that, all
else being equal, families with more children would choose good public schools while families
with few children would more likely choose private schools in poorer public school districts. 
5.23. Evidence from Current Experiments
While private school choice experiments in the U.S. at this point are too small to give rise
to effects such as those simulated in this paper, there are other types of choice arrangements for
which the model has similar testable implications. For instance, large numbers of charter and
magnet schools in various states do not use residence-based admissions criteria so common in the
rest of the public school system. Although clearly different from private school choice in that no
tuition requirements are made of parents and various regulations inhibit the more extreme forms
of cream-skimming, the introduction of such choice vehicles within the public system does
weaken the link between residential and school choices. If such arrangements are wide-spread in
a given geographic region, then mobility and price effects similar to those predicted in the
simulations of Section 4 should emerge.
Similarly, public school choice programs (such as those in Minnesota) – to the extent that
they offer true choice rather than having good public schools close their doors by claiming
capacity constraints – similarly alter the link between residential location and school choice. As a
result, a model similar to that applied to private school choice in this paper would suggest48
capitalization effects that reflect this change. Research on this topic, to my knowledge, has been
limited, although Reback (2000) provides preliminary evidence that mobility forces of the type
raised in Section 4.1 may play an important role.
Finally, the model offers predictions regarding private school formation, residential
segregation, housing price differences, etc. for different types of state funding systems for public
schools, but these are explored elsewhere (Nechyba (1999, 2000b)). Given the diversity of such
state system as well as their changing nature over the past few decades, such state differences
provide yet another opportunity to test predictions other than those related to increasing choice.
One notable test comes out of the 1970's California experience, where school finance changed
rapidly and gave rise to a large number of private schools in a relatively short period of time. 
Downes and Greenstein (1996) present evidence on these private school formation and
particularly the location of new private schools. Consistent with predictions arising from the
model in this paper, they show that private schools tended to form in lower income districts and
near poorly performing public schools. 
6. Policy Implications
The large policy implication emerging not only from the simulations reported in this paper
but also from the broader research project referenced throughout is that, given the evidence that
the links of residential, political and school choices are strong in the current system, these links
are potentially important for a variety of school finance policies including the proposal of
expanding choice through vouchers. When models abstract away from these links, the debate on
vouchers becomes a stylized argument over which of two forces – the cream-skimming of private49
schools or the efficiency enhancements of increased choice – is likely to dominate. As a matter of
theoretical exploration, limiting models to considering only some forces in isolation is, of course,
extremely valuable and has provided numerous insights, some of which are included in the
simulation exercises above. But, as a matter of policy analysis, forces that are best analyzed in
isolation for conceptual clarification must ultimately be analyzed in a single framework. 
The exercise in this paper is therefore one of expanding the framework within which we
analyze the merits of vouchers to include components that move us away from a narrow debate
and toward utilizing empirical facts that are less controversial than those asserted in much of the
debate. These include (1) a recognition of the fact that the current public school system is far from
a homogeneous ideal and full of inequities that are commonly acknowledged in the literature; (2)
that these inequities are due largely to a linkage of residential and school choices that offer real
school choice to only those who can afford to live in multiple types of school districts; (3) that the
forces which have shaped current schools under the current choice environment are unlikely to
change as choice is expanded; (4) that political processes are important and will likely continue to
be important in setting school spending and thus school quality differences; and (5) that private
schools arising from voucher policies are likely to search out high peer quality students over low
peer quality students. It is only after finding implications from these primitives that we have
moved on to consider additional forces that are more controversial.
6.1. Winners and Losers from Vouchers
Most policies have clear winners and losers. In the case of private school vouchers,
however, the problem of identifying precisely who wins and who loses is not an easy one. The44 A third avenue through which households are affected is through changing tax burdens, but we forego a
detailed analysis of these effects here. Furthermore, households already attending private schools benefit from lump sum
transfers through the voucher.
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analysis in this paper offers an opportunity to suggest which households are likely to definitely
win, which might win under different assumptions, and which are most likely to lose. The gains
and losses to households in the model arise from two different effects: First, most households will
experience some change in the school quality consumed by their children, and second,
homeowners are likely to experience capital gains or losses as changing school choice affects
market prices.
44  We can then discuss each of these in turn.
6.11.  Winners and Losers in School Quality
With respect to winners and losers in terms of educational quality, the intuitions arising
form this model are similar to those in the current single-district literature. Because private
schools are assumed to gain a competitive advantage through their ability to exclude low peer
quality students, it is clearly high peer quality students that are most likely to experience
improvements in their school quality. In the context of the model in this paper, peer quality arises
from both family income and child ability. Thus, relatively high ability children from high income
households who do not choose private schools before vouchers are put in place are the first to
benefit from higher private school quality. Conversely, low ability children from low income
households are likely to see little benefit or modest declines in their school quality as either public
schools decrease in quality or they are forced to choose a private school with only their peer type.
Similarly, low ability children from higher income households do not switch to private schools
unless voucher amounts become high, and they, too, experience similar modest declines in their45 In particular, Fiske and Ladd (2000) present compelling evidence that this has occurred under the public
school choice reforms in New Zealand. 
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public school quality. The main additional insight offered by the model here over previous single-
district models is that declines in public school quality are likely to be spread across districts even
if private schools themselves arise primarily in poor districts, and because of this they are not
likely to be as large as might otherwise be predicted (or may in fact be absent for some school
financing systems). An important caveat to this, however, is that a restriction of vouchers to only
poor households (as opposed to a targeting to poor districts) gives rise to sharper losses for public
schools in poor districts once vouchers are taken up at high rates, and competitive effects are not
readily spread to other districts whose populations do not qualify for the voucher regardless of
where they move. 
The prediction becomes significantly more rosy, however, as competitive effects are
introduced. Since public school quality now generally increases, all children can in principle
benefit from the introduction of vouchers. The precise nature of this competitive effect is, of
course, important, as is the nature of the voucher itself. Particular concern for children who
remain in poor public schools is warranted both because they are most likely to suffer in the
absence of a competitive effect within the context of this model, and because of empirical
evidence from abroad suggesting the possibility that choice may leave those children behind even
when benefitting most other children.
45 Furthermore, the simulations suggest that vouchers
limited only to low income families (as opposed to low income districts) carry with them a bigger
potential threat to public schools in the poorest districts. The ambiguity regarding the likely
impact of vouchers on those children that remain in low-income public school districts therefore
suggests that voucher initiatives -- especially those motivated by concerns for poor children --46 Including renters does not alter the positive predictions of the model significantly as the capital gains and
losses for homeowners (which are absent for renters) produce only income effects that do not alter behavior in major
ways. Renters would have similar incentives to settle in poor districts if they choose private schools. 
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ought to be accompanied by strong efforts to independently improve public schools in those
districts. And the insights regarding migration effects that are uncovered in this model suggest
that district targeting is a much more effective way of limiting eligibility than household targeting
– both on efficiency grounds (because district targeting spreads the competitive effect throughout
the public school system) and on equity grounds. 
6.12. Winners and Losers in Housing Markets
Winners and losers in housing markets are more easily identified. As already discussed in
Section 5.21, and despite the fact that renters are not specifically included in the model of this
paper, we can predict from the results in this model that homeowners and renters are impacted
differently.
46 In particular, homeowners in good districts experience relatively large capital losses
while homeowners in poor school districts experience capital gains. Renters, of course, do not
experience such gains and losses. Finally, to the extent that neighborhood effects may spread
beyond school buildings, the de-segregating effect of vouchers may have additional benefits for
poor districts that are not modeled in this paper.
6.2. Implications for Targeting Vouchers
After the failure of broad based vouchers to pass the political test in several state
referenda, it now seems likely that voucher policies – to the extent that they will be enacted – will
be targeted in some way. Current experiments at the city-level are following that pattern with53
only low income families qualifying for vouchers, and the only state-wide plan to pass a
legislature and be enacted (Florida) has targeted vouchers to underperforming schools, as does the
Bush proposal at the national level. The two kinds of targeting – toward low income households
or low income/underperforming schools, however, are predicted to have very different
implications within the framework of this paper. 
More precisely, vouchers targeted to low income families have little impact in the context
of this model unless the voucher amount is set quite high. The reason for this is that household-
targeted vouchers do not unleash similar mobility and capitalization effects as moving would
have little value to anyone whose income is too high to receive the voucher. District targeting, on
the other hand, creates the incentive to move in order to take advantage of private schools.
Vouchers targeted to low income households would therefore not give rise to the forces that a
multi-district model picks up, and single-district models illustrating the tradeoffs between cream
skimming private schools and benefits from competition would give predictions similar to models
of the kind employed in this paper. The clear policy implication, then, is that higher response
rates are to be expected from district targeting than from household targeting, and these are likely
to have greater efficiency and equity enhancing consequences.
6.3. Designing Politically Feasible Vouchers
The difference in implications for different types of targeting thus rests on the fact that
district targeting takes advantage of mobility forces while household targeting does not, and this
may lead policy makers to view district targeting as a more effective tool to infuse competition
into the public school system. On the other hand, this same difference makes district targeting54
considerably less politically palatable to the population as a whole unless large competitive gains
in public schools are expected. More specifically, district targeting affects homeowners in ways
very similar to no targeting at all, with homeowners in wealthy districts suffering and
homeowners in poor districts gaining. If voters are aware of such effects when expressing
political preference for or against vouchers (as Brunner et. al. (2000) suggest California voters
were in 1994), homeowners in good school districts are almost as likely to be opposed to district
targeted vouchers as they are to universal vouchers. Put differently, targeting to households
instead of districts would in effect isolate homeowners in such districts from capital losses. 
Thus, the same factors that cause district targeting to be a more potent policy tool are
likely to make it politically more difficult to implement. A trade-off between policy impact and
political feasibility therefore emerges for policy makers. This tradeoff is unlikely to be optimally
resolved at either extreme (i.e. pure district targeting or pure household targeting) and is more
likely to involve a combination of district targeting with income phase outs. To the extent that
higher income households are ineligible for vouchers, this reduces the mobility and capitalization
effects but may increase their willingness to agree to the proposal. On the other hand, if
competitive effects are sought, these too are diminished as income phase outs become more
severe. A detailed analysis of this tradeoff is, however, beyond the scope of this paper.  
6.4. Short Run versus Long Run
A final issue worth raising involves the timing of changes and their impact. The model in
this paper has little to offer in regard to this as it does not include a multi-period analysis during
which households adjust to policies. Rather, the model provides a snapshot of the pre-voucher55
world and another of the post-voucher prediction but is not equipped to analyze the transition.
The most critical issue is, of course, that of the speed at which mobility forces come into play.
While I have cited evidence that price adjustment to new education-related information are
relatively fast, residential moves are typically undertaken for multiple reasons, with education
being only one. Thus, a likely transition would include household relocations for a variety of job
or family related reasons, where the considerations related to schools come into play once the
decision to move has been made on other grounds. As a result, those predictions related to
mobility are likely to take some time to unfold and require reasonable confidence on the part of
households that policy changes are not just transitory. 
In the short run, it may therefore be prudent to place some weight on results emerging
from single-district models in which residential location is, in effect, assumed to be fixed. As is
mentioned throughout this paper, this would imply considerably more negative short run effects
of vouchers because the more positive effects arise primarily from multi-district considerations.
In addition, voucher take-up rates would be considerably more muted in the short run, and
decreases in public school quality more concentrated. Therefore, while the model has little to
offer in terms of predicting the length of time between short run and long run effects, it does
suggest that a full evaluation of the impact of large scale voucher programs will require a
considerable period of maintaining the policy in place.
7. Conclusion
In summary, this paper has placed the previously analyzed forces related to private school
vouchers into a multi-district context that is capable of more accurately establishing a pre-voucher56
benchmark from which to conduct policy analysis. I have then argued that this gives rise to a
number of general equilibrium effects which are important to such an analysis. Two main
conclusions emerge: First, most voucher policies have profound implications for how the broader
set of choices that households make are undertaken and how residential districts are likely to
evolve – with vouchers offering a large potential for reducing income segregation across district
boundaries. Second, the likely impact of private school vouchers on public school quality depends
on a number of assumptions regarding public school responses – assumptions that all remain
controversial. Under the more pessimistic set of assumptions, public school quality may suffer as
a result of vouchers, although this decline would not be as large or as concentrated as predicted
by a narrower single-district analysis. Under more positive assumptions, on the other hand, public
school quality may improve through private school competition. In one case overall school
quality (including private schools) remains relatively unchanged with clear winners and losers (in
terms of educational opportunities), while in the other cases both average quality and the variance
in quality can improve significantly. Since the potential losers (in terms of school quality) under
the more pessimistic assumptions of the model are the very poorest children who remain in public
schools in poor districts, an important implication arising from these simulations is that caution
would dictate that strong efforts to independently improve public schools in poor districts
accompany any vouchers intended to help poor children. Similarly, the simulations suggest a
more hopeful picture for vouchers targeted to districts rather than vouchers that are targeted to
households. More empirical analysis is of course required in order to narrow the range of likely
school quality outcomes under different types of voucher policies.57
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District 1 3.1120 0.6121 0.2000 0.6652 0.4322
District 2 4.6216 1.0720 0.2250 0.7910 0.6178
District 3 6.5863 1.5248 0.1250 0.8621 0.7803
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*Calculated from static values assuming 5.5% interest rate.61







Avg. Property Values* Ratio:
Dist.3 Avg./
Dist. 1 Avg. Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
None $25,700 $50,175 $67,325 2.62 $8,254 $11,844 $13,892 1.68
No Private
Schools
Local Tax $17,628 $39,647 $85,925 4.87 $5,301 $10,639 $20,457 3.86
State Tax $19,875 $42,250 $81,075 4.08 $5,322 $11,507 $20,204 3.80
Private
Schools 
Local Tax $29,725 $50,262 $63,212 2.13 $6,424 $11,038 $15,370 2.39
State Tax $29,891 $51,309 $62,000 2.07 $6,177 $11,800 $16,490 2.67
   *Property Values here are expressed as annualized flows.62
Table 4a: Private School Vouchers under Local Public Financing
Vouch.
Amount
Average Income Property Values* Ratio: Dist. 3/Dist. 1 Percent Private





$0 $29,725 $63,212 $6,424 $15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30% 10%
$1,000 $31,925 $59,800 $7,122 $14,654 1.8731 2.0576 40% 10%
$2,500 $33,425 $58,000 $9,097 $14,468 1.7352 1.5904 62.5% 25%
$4,000 $33,125 $57,425 $8,256 $13,339 1.7336 1.6157 87.5% 30%





$0 $29,725 $63,212 $6,424 $15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30% 10%
$1,000 $34,050 $59,950 $7,124 $14,974 1.7606 2.1019 37.5% 10%
$2,500 $37,125 $54,125 $9,979 $14,804 1.4579 1.4835 70% 10%
$4,000 $43,275 $52,950 $13,741 $15,141 1.2236 1.1019 100% 17.5%








$0 $29,725 $63,212 $6,424 $15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30% 10%
$1,000 $29,725 $63,212 $6,424 $15,370 2.1266 2.3926 30% 10%
$2,500 $30,185 $62,320 $6,513 $15,220 2.0646 2.3369 45% 10%
$4,000 $32,325 $60,340 $7,012 $15,184 1.8667 2.1654 82.5% 7.5%
$5,000 $32,675 $62,250 $9,187 $15,589 1.9051 1.6969 100% 10%
*Property values are expressed as annualized flows.63
Table 4b: Vouchers under Cental Public Financing
Vouch.
Amount
Average Income Property Values* Ratio: Dist. 3/Dist. 1 Percent Private





$0 $29,891 $62,000 $6,177 $16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5% 15%
$1,000 $33,375 $60,350 $6,215 $15,599 1.8082 2.5099 30% 25%
$2,500 $34,188 $58,254 $6,431 $15,851 1.7039 2.4648 35% 27.5%
$4,000 $33,500 $61,225 $7,710 $14,908 1.8276 1.9336 62.5% 30%





$0 $29,891 $62,000 $6,177 $16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5% 15%
$1,000 $33,400 $59,645 $6,242 $15,711 1.7858 2.5170 30% 12.5%
$2,500 $39,326 $59,825 $6,720 $15,940 1.5213 2.3720 42.5% 11.25%
$4,000 $43,202 $53,861 $8,652 $16,805 1.2467 1.9423 70% 10%








$0 $29,891 $62,000 $6,177 $16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5% 15%
$1,000 $29,891 $62,000 $6,177 $16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5% 15%
$2,500 $29,891 $62,000 $6,177 $16,490 2.0742 2.6696 22.5% 15%
$4,000 $30,281 $61,348 $6,091 $16,573 2.0260 2.7209 37.5% 12.5%
$5,000 $31,644 $60,858 $5,910 $16,940 1.9232 2.8663 52.5% 10%
*Property values are expressed as annualized flows.64
Table 4c: Vouchers under New Jersey Financing System
Vouch.
Amount
Average Income Property Values* Ratio: Dist. 3/Dist. 1 Percent Private





$0 $31,120 $65,863 $6,121 $15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20% 12.5%
$1,000 $32,845 $63,100  $6,534 $14,921 1.9211 2.2836 32.5% 15%
$2,500 $35,525 $60,050 $8,692 $14,312 1.6904 1.6466 40% 22.5%
$4,000 $33,350 $61,340 $9,342 $13,164 1.8393 1.4091 67.5% 30%





$0 $31,120 $65,863 $6,121 $15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20% 12.5%
$1,000 $33,250 $61,125 $6,623 $15,120 1.8383 2.2830 35% 12.5%
$2,500 $38,466 $56,380 $9,922 $14,792 1.4657 1.4908 47.5% 15%
$4,000 $43,620 $52,890 $12,331 $14,910 1.2125 1.2091 82.5% 15%








$0 $31,120 $65,863 $6,121 $15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20% 12.5%
$1,000 $31,120 $65,863 $6,121 $15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20% 12.5%
$2,500 $31,120 $65,863 $6,121 $15,248 2.1164 2.4911 20% 12.5%
$4,000 $31,833 $64,421 $6,223 $15,005 2.0237 2.4112 40% 12.5%
$5,000 $32,960 $63,184 $7,325 $15,225 1.9170 2.0785 67.5% 10%
*Property values are expressed as annualized flows.65
Table 5a: Vouchers and Public School Quality under Local Financing and Cream Skimming
All Eligible for Voucher
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2613 0.5142 0.6404 $5,000 $7,326 $10,215 0.36737 0.61922 0.8183 30% 20% 10%
$1,000 0.2292 0.4745 0.6000 $5,000 $7,593 $9,768 0.34519 0.60734 0.77494 40% 27.5% 10%
$2,500 0.2211 0.3036 0.5419 $5,000 $7,645 $9,555 0.33934 0.49302 0.72985 62.5% 40% 12.5%
$4,000 0.1054 0.1370 0.3373 $5,000 $5,000 $9,388 0.23868 0.27033 0.57731 87.5% 82.5% 30%
$5,000 *** *** 0.2626 *** *** 0.9696 *** *** 0.004 100% 100% 37.5%
Voucher Targeted to District 1 Residents Only
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2613 0.5142 0.6404 $5,000 $7,326 $10,215 0.36737 0.61922 0.8183 30% 20% 10%
$1,000 0.2097 0.4026 0.4943 $5,000 $7,065 $9,539 0.33092 0.54088 0.69805 37.5% 25% 10%
$2,500 0.2015 0.2984 0.4944 $5,000 $6,346 $8,333 0.32471 0.44345 0.65029 70% 40% 10%
$4,000 *** 0.2174 0.3993 *** $5,000 $7,774 *** 0.33663 0.56651 100% 40% 17.5%
$5,000 *** 0.2152 0.3937 *** $5,000 $7,777 *** 0.33501 0.56283 100% 40% 19.8%66
Voucher Targeted to Families with Incomes below $25,000
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2613 0.5142 0.6404 $5,000 $7,326 $10,215 0.36737 0.61922 0.8183 30% 20% 10%
$1,000 0.2613 0.5142 0.6404 $5,000 $7,326 $10,215 0.36737 0.61922 0.8183 30% 20% 10%
$2,500 0.2104 0.4718 0.6404 $5,000 $7,381 $10,146 0.33144 0.59675 0.8154 45% 10%
$4,000 0.1054 0.4142 0.6307 $5,000 $7269 $9,801 0.23868 0.55648 0.79494 82.5% 25% 7.5%
$5,000 *** 0.3993 0.6298 *** $7,132 $9,657 *** 0.54144 0.78825 100% 25% 10%67
Table 5b: Vouchers and Public School Quality under State Financing and Cream Skimming
All Eligible for Voucher
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2826 0.5469 0.6470 $7,195 $7,195 $7,195 0.46158 0.63161 0.6841 22.5% 17.5% 15%
$1,000 0.2619 0.5688 0.5727 $7,363 $7,363 $7,363 0.45063 0.65134 0.65346 30% 10% 25%
$2,500 0.2570 0.5040 0.5652 $7,781 $7,781 $7,781 0.45974 0.63306 0.66848 35% 22.5% 27.5%
$4,000 0.2055 0.3117 0.4713 $8,831 $8,831 $8,831 0.44182 0.53849 0.65535 62.5% 40% 30%
$5,000 *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** *** 100% 100% 100%
Voucher Targeted to District 1 Residents Only
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2826 0.5469 0.6470 $7,195 $7,195 $7,195 0.46158 0.63161 0.6841 22.5% 17.5% 15%
$1,000 0.2762 0.5582 0.5962 $7,336 $7,336 $7,336 0.46126 0.6443 0.66478 30% 10% 12.5%
$2,500 0.2529 0.5048 0.5969 $7,416 $7,416 $7,416 0.44488 0.61776 0.66895 40% 12.5% 11.3%
$4,000 0.2208 0.3314 0.5447 $7,904 $7,904 $7,904 0.43129 0.52304 0.66228 70% 27.5% 10%
$5,000 *** 0.2301 0.3204 *** $4,250 $4,250 *** 0.31755 0.37163 100% 40% 37.5%68
Voucher Targeted to Families with Incomes below $25,000
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2826 0.5469 0.6470 $7,195 $7,195 $7,195 0.46158 0.63161 0.6841 22.5% 17.5% 15%
$1,000 0.2826 0.5469 0.6470 $7,195 $7,195 $7,195 0.46158 0.63161 0.6841 22.5% 17.5% 15%
$2,500 0.2826 0.5469 0.6470 $7,195 $7,195 $7,195 0.46158 0.63161 0.6841 22.5% 17.5% 15%
$4,000 0.2521 0.5348 0.6470 $7,293 $7,293 $7,293 0.44032 0.62939 0.68898 37.5% 17.5% 12.5%
$5,000 0.2347 0.5247 0.6662 $7,456 $7,456 $7,456 0.43059 0.63099 0.70677 52.5% 17.5% 10%69
Table 5c: Vouchers and Public School Quality under New Jersey Funding System and Cream Skimming
All Eligible for Voucher
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2684 0.4701 0.6989 $6,652 $7,910 $8,621 0.43224 0.61778 0.78031 20% 22.5% 12.5%
$1,000 0.2422 0.4698 0.6521 $6,923 $7,734 $8,354 0.42038 0.61034 0.74267 32.5% 22.5% 15%
$2,500 0.2212 0.4110 0.5910 $7,054 $7,221 $8,111 0.40663 0.55251 0.69786 40% 27.5% 22.5%
$4,000 0.1124 0.3302 0.4127 $5,000 $6,939 $7,781 0.24608 0.48764 0.57573 67.5% 40% 30%
$5,000 *** 0.1425 0.2921 *** $5,000 0.8004 *** 0.27544 0.004 100% 82.5% 32.5%
Voucher Targeted to District 1 Residents Only
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2684 0.4701 0.6989 $6,652 $7,910 $8,621 0.43224 0.61778 0.78031 20% 22.5% 12.5%
$1,000 0.2416 0.4623 0.5881 $6,992 $7,812 $8,572 0.42207 0.60889 0.71673 35% 22.5% 12.5%
$2,500 0.2183 0.3945 0.4916 $6,859 $7,696 $8,210 0.39819 0.56029 0.6435 47.5% 30% 15%
$4,000 0.1058 0.2772 0.4122 $5,000 $7,102 $8,114 0.23911 0.45426 0.5882 82.5% 42.5% 15%
$5,000 *** 0.2294 0.4097 *** $6,910 $7,761 *** 0.40927 0.57297 100% 47.5% 17.5%70
Voucher Targeted to Households with Incomes below $25,000
Peer Quality Per Pupil Spending School Quality Percent Attending Private
Voucher Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3 Dist. 1 Dist. 2 Dist. 3
$0 0.2684 0.4701 0.6989 $6,652 $7,910 $8,621 0.43224 0.61778 0.78031 20% 22.5% 12.5%
$1,000 0.2684 0.4701 0.6989 $6,652 $7,910 $8,621 0.43224 0.61778 0.78031 20% 22.5% 12.5%
$2,500 0.2684 0.4701 0.6989 $6,652 $7,910 $8,621 0.43224 0.61778 0.78031 20% 22.5% 12.5%
$4,000 0.1988 0.4365 0.6922 $6,832 $7,892 $8,638 0.38009 0.59568 0.77755 40% 22.5% 12.5%
$5,000 0.1438 0.4022 0.6856 $5,000 $7,834 $8,551 0.27663 0.57076 0.76991 67.5% 20% 10%71
Table 6a: School Quality and Vouchers under New Jersey Calibration 
and Universally Available Vouchers
Schools Become more Efficient through Curriculum Targeting
VOUCHER
AMOUNT












District 1 District 2 District 3
$0 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 *** 18.67%
$1,000 0.4528 0.6012 0.7705 1.1167 0.9721 23.50%
$2,500 0.4770 0.6216 0.7679 1.0335 0.9512 29.25%
$4,000 0.4833 0.6277 0.7802 0.9411 0.9481 36.33%
$5,000 0.4551 0.6014 0.7522 0.8623 0.9551 46.66%
Schools Become more Efficient through More Efficient Resource Utilization
VOUCHER
AMOUNT












District 1 District 2 District 3
$0 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 *** 19.25%
$1,000 0.4127 0.6233 0.7771 1.1018 0.9891 24.33%
$2,500 0.4273 0.6421 0.7849 1.0911 0.9821 27.25%
$4,000 0.4351 0.6591 0.8033 1.0300 0.9755 32.66%
$5,000 0.4391 0.6718 0.8116 1.0029 0.9812 33.00%72
Table 6b: School Quality and Vouchers under New Jersey Calibration 
and District 1 Targeted Vouchers
Schools Become more Efficient through Curriculum Targeting
VOUCHER
AMOUNT












District 1 District 2 District 3
$0 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 *** 18.67%
$1,000 0.4613 0.5892 0.7783 1.1218 0.9721 23.25%
$2,500 0.4852 0.5923 0.7811 1.0613 0.9512 26.12%
$4,000 0.4925 0.6011 0.7734 1.0015 0.9481 26.12%
$5,000 0.4727 0.5985 0.7692 0.9476 0.9551 35.25%
Schools Become more Efficient through More Efficient Resource Utilization
VOUCHER
AMOUNT












District 1 District 2 District 3
$0 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 *** 19.25%
$1,000 0.4096 0.6186 0.7685 1.1102 0.9932 24.25%
$2,500 0.4111 0.6322 0.7774 1.1033 0.9906 26.00%
$4,000 0.4171 0.6456 0.7813 1.0731 0.9843 29.50%
$5,000 0.4219 0.6555 0.7938 1.0663 0.9892 30.25%73
Table 6c: School Quality and Vouchers under New Jersey Calibration 
and Vouchers targeted to Households with Incomes below $25,000
Schools Become more Efficient through Curriculum Targeting
VOUCHER
AMOUNT












District 1 District 2 District 3
$0 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 *** 18.67%
$1,000 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 1.0000 18.67%
$2,500 0.4167 0.5922 0.7761 1.1628 1.0000 18.67%
$4,000 0.4439 0.5881 0.7734 1.0872 0.9822 21.85%
$5,000 0.4623 0.5793 0.7702 0.9763 0.9719 27.33%
Schools Become more Efficient through More Efficient Resource Utilization
VOUCHER
AMOUNT












District 1 District 2 District 3
$0 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 *** 19.25%
$1,000 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 1.0000 19.25%
$2,500 0.4023 0.6121 0.7629 1.1711 1.0000 19.25%
$4,000 0.3827 0.6281 0.7774 1.1005 1.0441 23.50%
$5,000 0.3540 0.6411 0.7829 1.0324 1.0720 26.67%74





Private Schools Markets Permitted
No 
Vouchers
Non-Targeted Vouchers District-Targeted Vouchers
Local Cent.
Voucher=0.25 Voucher=0.50 Voucher=0.25  Voucher=0.50
Local Cent. Local Cent. Local Cent. Local Cent. Local Cent.
School Quality as Modeled in Section 4.1
Income 4.874 4.079 2.126 2.074 1.735 1.704 1.715 2.255 1.458 1.521 1.202 1.331
Property 3.859 3.796 2.392 2.667 1.590 2.465 1.472 1.683 1.484 2.372 1.053 1.287
Schools Become more Efficient through Curriculum Targeting
Income 4.505 4.188 2.076 2.033 1.798 1.921 1.832 2.119 1.397 1.510 1.193 1.279
Property 3.791 3.586 2.222 2.512 1.553 2.213 1.394 1.762 1.427 2.181 1.081 1.231
Schools Become more Efficient through More Efficient Resource Utilization
Income 4.771 3.892 2.231 2.100 1.751 1.691 1.802 2.387 1.424 1.478 1.249 1.414
Property 3.712 3.603 2.469 2.702 1.539 2.568 1.528 1.732 1.329 2.292 1.103 1.302